



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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New Hope for Cyprus and Algeria

by Mario Rossi

UNITED NATIONS—The colonial problem, most prominent in UN debates for many years, consisted in 1958 of only two main issues: Cyprus and Algeria.

The 13th UN General Assembly may or may not have added substantially to an understanding of these issues, let alone their solution. The importance of the deliberations and the significance of the stand taken by the 81 member nations have been variously interpreted according to the interests at stake and to what the parties had proposed to achieve. Greece, on behalf of the Greek Cypriotes, and 17 Afro-Asian countries, on behalf of the Algerian nationalists, obviously had not sought a solution within the framework of the UN.

Shortly before the General Assembly convened, the question of Cyprus had been considered, albeit unsuccessfully, at a meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Paris on October 29. The General Assembly concluded its debate of this issue on December 5, a few days before another NATO meeting which was expected to include Cyprus in its agenda. It was not surprising, therefore, that under the impact of the NATO disappointment, the principal parties—Greece, Turkey

and Britain—plunged into a bitter and intolerant debate at the UN, only to become gradually more moderate as the time for a new confrontation in Paris approached.

Shorn of its propagandistic trimmings, the UN debate showed that progress has been achieved during the past year. The Greek government announced its willingness to settle for the independence of Cyprus instead of enosis—the union of Cyprus with Greece—and this position won the support of the Cypriote leader, Archbishop Makarios. Britain for the first time withdrew its stubborn refusal even to consider eventual independence for the island, and now hopes to initiate a seven-year period of self-government. Turkey abandoned its unyielding position in favor of partition, and accepted the British plan.

This evolution, however encouraging, represents but a step toward a betterment of the situation which is still far from realization. The chief obstacle to conciliation is the widespread violence on the island, with Cypriote terrorism answered by harsh British counter-measures.

When the debate began the Assembly had before it seven resolutions with numerous

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proposed amendments. A week later the Political Committee adopted a resolution offered by Iran favoring self-government.

The vote on this resolution was 31 to 22, with 28 abstentions. In the plenary meeting, where a two-thirds majority is required for important issues, the resolution would have failed to pass. In view of the forthcoming NATO meeting the situation was ominous, and Mexico saved the day by introducing at the last moment a new resolution which was adopted without objection. It reads: "The General Assembly . . . expresses its confidence that continued efforts will be made by the parties to reach a peaceful, democratic and just solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations."

De Gaulle's New Move

The problem of Algeria has proved far more complex. The nationalists have recently set up a "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," mainly for the purpose of being able to negotiate with the Paris government, if and when possible, on a footing of equality. France does not regard the Algerian problem of international concern, and has hitherto refused to recognize the existence of the rebel government.

This official attitude, however, does not tell the entire story. Several initiatives by President Charles de Gaulle when he was still premier had given rise to the hope that a formula conducive to negotiations might yet be found. But negotiations with whom? and on what basis? This is the heart of the problem.

The elections held in Algeria September 26-28 under French army auspices have not, as hoped by de Gaulle, produced valid spokesmen for the Algerians. No one in Paris is under any illusion that the "Algerian" deputies elected at that time can speak on behalf of a majority of the North African population. The Algerian nationalists, for their part, pointed out that, after four years, an unrelenting war continues in Algeria and that they alone can bring it to a halt. This result, they said, can only emerge from direct negotiations between themselves and the French.

When the Algeria question was brought before the General Assembly, the French were absent, while the Algerian nationalists were not seeking a UN-sponsored solution but rather as much support for their position as they could muster so as to strengthen their bargaining power in eventual negotiations with the French. This is why they insisted on a resolution which referred to the "Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic" and to "the right of the Algerian people to independence," besides calling for "negotiations between the two parties concerned with a view to reaching a solution in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations." The resolution was approved by the Political Committee by a vote of 32 to 18 with 30 abstentions, and a revised draft was lost in the plenary meeting by one vote only. The Algerian nationalists considered the result a great success for their position, since the number of nations which had implicitly sided with France was no

more than 18. Especially significant was the fact that the abstainers included the Scandinavian countries, most of Latin America and a number of Afro-Asian countries. Even the United States did not support France in the plenary meeting and decided to abstain.

On January 13 the prospect for an Algerian settlement was greatly improved when the French government decreed the widest measures of clemency for Algerian rebels adopted since the start of fighting four years ago. The leader of the moderate Algerian National Movement, Hadj Messali, who had been held in forced residence on an island off the coast of Brittany, was permitted to live where he wished in France—but not in Algeria. Four members of the Algerian rebel government and another rebel leader who had been seized by the French in 1956 were transferred from Santé Prison to an unnamed fortress. In Algeria the sentences of 180 rebels condemned to death were commuted to life imprisonment, and about 7,000 persons interned in camps by an administrative decision were to be freed. These measures were interpreted as an indication that France was in the process of negotiating a settlement with the Algerian rebels in Cairo, possibly involving the formation of some kind of North African federation linking Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria which might, in turn, form a part of the French Community.

Writer and lecturer, Mr. Rossi for the past five years has reported for *The Christian Science Monitor* on Middle Eastern, South-east Asian and North African events as reflected at the United Nations.

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347

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Western Europe Forges Economic Union

The 13 American colonies in the 18th century found that they had to hang together or face hanging separately. Today Western Europe is beginning to face the grim realities of 20th-century existence and, what is more important, is doing something about it.

If the year-end headlines had not been so filled with the Cuban revolution, Russia's "lunik," and the crisis over Berlin, they might have reported more fully the economic revolution going on in Western Europe—the revolution which is literally forcing the still free countries of that area to federate economically. For the transformation underway in Europe—if it succeeds—deserves to rank with such great turning points in history as the Reformation and the Industrial Revolution. After prolonged hesitation Western Europe is not just talking boldly about financial and economic reorganization and integration; it is taking bold steps to achieve them. And the political potentials of this development are as momentous as its economic and fiscal repercussions.

Common Market a Reality

Already six European countries—France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg—have pooled their coal, steel and atomic energy through the European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom. Now the following further steps are being taken:

First, these six European countries, on New Year's Day, set up a Common Market, reducing tariffs on trade with each other by 10 percent, and agreeing to end all tariffs between them within 15 years. By 1973 goods will move as freely from

Rome to Brussels as they do from Detroit to Dallas; so will raw materials, currencies, labor. By that time the six countries will have a common tariff toward the outside world, but none between themselves. This Common Market comprises some 160 million persons—approximately the present population of the United States. The Six are keeping their armies, and flags, and languages, and ways of life. The Common Market enthusiasts, however, expect that as a result of the momentum now generated, these countries will, in time, merge politically as they are now doing economically, creating a real United States of Europe. This is a centuries-old dream. But it is beginning to be realized now because of the prospect that the alternative would be disaster for all.

Second, ten countries—Britain, France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and Denmark—with Britain in the lead, have made their currencies externally convertible. Foreign holders of these countries' currencies can now convert their money into any currency they want, including United States dollars. What this means is that the currencies of the Ten are becoming strong enough to stand unsupported in the world market—an impressive testimony to Europe's general economic recovery.

Third, France, under the powerful direction of President Charles de Gaulle, took the plunge on December 27 by devaluing the franc 10 percent and thus bringing it into line with its real value. At the same time de Gaulle has raised taxes and cut subsidies, giving France an "austerity" program such as few if any

Frenchmen can recall. There are reports that the French, impressed though they are with their president's political leadership, are beginning to grumble over what de Gaulle calls his "verity and severity" program. But the general has restored France's political respectability and seems to be the only one who can force the French to swallow the dose of economic castor oil they so badly need and have so long put off taking. Fortunately the West Germans, the British and other Western Europeans have pledged their help in supporting the franc—as has also the United States.

The advantages of these three major steps taken to shake Europe out of its economic lethargy are not without drawbacks. On balance, however, the "pros" of these steps far outweigh the "cons." Washington is convinced that what Europe did was wise, necessary, even imperative, if it was to meet the challenge of world events and the threat of Soviet competition and subversion.

It is no secret that Britain and other European countries left out of the six-nation Common Market are concerned over the tariff barriers they see rising against them. Of the 17 nations which make up what is generally called "free Europe," and officially called the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.), six are at present inside the Common Market and eleven outside. Britain, because of its economic ties with the Commonwealth, could not join the Common Market, and other nations, notably Sweden and Switzerland, are precluded from joining by their policy of neutrality or nonalignment.

These "outsiders" have suggested

a "free-trade area" composed of themselves and the "inside six," in which members would trade freely with one another while each would keep its own set of tariff walls toward the outside world. The Six rejected this plan, first proposed by Britain, on the ground that it was a bid by the Eleven to "have their cake

and eat it too"—to benefit from free trade in the Common Market area while also being free to leak goods at will to the outside world.

Despite these differences, there is no question that Western Europe's move toward economic cooperation and federation is picking up speed. This is a development of which the

United States thoroughly approves, and to which it has contributed substantially through the Marshall Plan and other aid programs. To quote the West German minister of economic affairs, Ludwig Erhard, on New Year's Day, Europe is seeing "the end of an illusion."

NEAL STANFORD



FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT

Peace in the Middle East... Whose Job?

At the height of the Lebanon crisis last summer it looked as if the job of keeping peace in the Middle East had been assumed by the United States, with the aid of Britain in Jordan. The West's major objective at that time was to prevent Lebanon, torn by civil strife, from being absorbed into President Nasser's United Arab Republic along with Iraq, where General Abdul Karim el-Kassem had overthrown King Faisal in a bloody coup, and Jordan, which seemed on the verge of dissolution. If expansion of the UAR could be blocked, the West believed, the U.S.S.R.'s hopes of playing a major role in the Middle East would be effectively dashed.

During the ensuing six months the scenery on the Middle East stage has been dramatically shifted. Nasser, previously regarded by many Westerners as the Arab world's No. 1 enemy of the West, a puppet of Moscow and a threat to peace, is now viewed as the most important factor for stability.

All Roads to Cairo

Today all roads lead to Cairo. Egypt's president finds himself courted by West as well as East. United States Assistant Secretary of State William M. Rountree, Italian Premier Amintore Fanfani, East German Premier Otto Grotewohl,

Marshal Tito en route to Indonesia, Russian diplomats, Czech technicians and West German businessmen jostle each other at this strategic crossroads. Most important of all for the long run, President Eugene Black of the World Bank has visited Cairo in a successful effort to bring about a settlement between Britain and Egypt of claims and counter-claims arising out of the Suez crisis.

Every visitor has special objectives. Premier Fanfani hopes to advance his country's oil interests in Egypt, promoted by the Italian financial wizard, Enrico Mattei, president of ENI, Italy's oil monopoly, and at the same time to improve the position of the 50,000 Italians settled in Egypt. Marshal Tito is anxious to create a group of states which, like Yugoslavia, would practice neutralism, avoiding commitments to either West or East but shunning Moscow's interference.

Mr. Grotewohl hopes to win increased prestige for East Germany by consular as well as trade ties with Egypt. West Germany, where a private consortium had recently offered financing for the High Aswan Dam, only to hold back its offer because of fear that the West Germans might have to work alongside the Russians, who have already pledged \$100 million for the first phase of the dam's construction, now fears Cairo's ac-

ceptance of East Germany. The British look to renewal of normal relations with Cairo, shattered by the Anglo-French attack on Suez, as a result of Mr. Black's good offices, in the hope of thereby reentering the Middle East. France, Britain's Suez ally, already signed a commercial agreement with Egypt on December 23.

Nasserism or Communism?

Meanwhile, the chief preoccupation of the United States has become, not to block Nasser, but, with his aid, to prevent the spread of Communist influence in Iraq. At first Washington feared that Kassem, like Nasser a military man inspired by nationalist sentiments and inclined to be suspicious of the West, might join forces with the Egyptian leader, and that an enlarged United Arab Republic composed of Iraq as well as Egypt and Syria would soon absorb Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and even Lebanon. When Kassem showed that he was opposed to pro-Nasser elements in Iraq and had no intention of accepting Nasser's leadership, the West took heart.

This relief, however, proved of brief duration when it became known that Iraqi Communists, some of them recently returned from Moscow, were taking over key posi-

(Continued on page 80)



Argentina Moving Toward Democracy

by Herbert L. Matthews

Mr. Matthews has been with *The New York Times* since 1922, and since 1949 has served as a member of its editorial staff, covering Latin American and Spanish affairs. He visited Argentina in the autumn of 1958.

The price of dictatorship for any country is high. If Argentina is grievously troubled today—as it is—a great deal of the blame can be traced to General Juan Domingo Perón. Of course, Perón was, himself, a natural product of what had gone before, especially since 1930 when a relatively democratic process of development was upset by the military. It is true, also, that much time has been wasted and many mistakes have been made since Perón was overthrown on September 16, 1955. And it would be too easy to blame Perón for all the ills that Argentina is now suffering.

Nevertheless, it is still a fact that a period of economic, political and social crisis was inevitable after the appalling mismanagement and corruption of 11 years of Peronism. That unsavory dictator, who became president in 1946, after serving for over two years as vice-president, inherited an economic and financial situation which was the envy of the rest of the world. World War II, during which Perón and his fellow officers favored and plotted with the Nazis, was a very prosperous period for Argentina. Its grains, meat and wool were at a premium and the prices it obtained were as high as the markets would bear. In 1945 Argentina had no less than \$1.7 billion in its exchequer.

Ten years later, in 1955, Argentina was bankrupt. This does not mean that everything Perón did was bad. He redeemed Argentina's entire foreign debt. He introduced a great deal of industrialization, much of it desirable, even if extravagant. He re-

duced economic inequalities and initiated many needed measures of social reform in favor of the workers. He gave women the same political rights as men. He purchased the Argentine railway system from the British, and while it deteriorated with dismayingly speed, this was a highly popular measure in Argentina's traditional atmosphere of economic nationalism.

Heritage of Peronism

Unfortunately for Argentina, the liabilities of the regime far outweighed the assets. Industrialization was achieved in part at the expense of the true wealth of the nation, which lay in its marvelously fertile pampas, cattle, wheat and wool. The social and economic betterment of the worker was accompanied by inflation and a class warfare new to Argentine society. During World War II huge sums had been spent on foreign goods which proved almost useless. Much of the industrialization was extravagant and ill-conceived. And all this was accompanied by immense corruption. It is conservatively estimated that Perón, who inherited the enormous fortune accumulated by his wife, Evita, now has a nest egg of something like \$300 million with which to enjoy himself in exile in the Dominican Republic and to finance the Peronist movement in Argentina. Everyone closely connected with the dictator also enriched himself. In the process the Argentines were deprived of all liberties.

Such a regime leaves a terrible heritage, and we have to keep this in

mind today when we are inclined to feel impatient at the slow, stumbling way in which Argentina is recovering its political and economic health. The monetary reserves were low, the peso weak; new heavy commercial debts were owed to foreign countries; the budget was woefully out of balance; communications were so bad that some crops could not be moved. Exports could not begin to cover necessary imports, especially as Argentina had to import all its oil and gasoline at a cost of more than a quarter of a billion dollars a year. Experts agree that Argentina probably has great quantities of oil in the ground, mainly along the eastern edge of the Andes mountains, but nationalist feelings run so high in Argentina that Perón contributed to his own downfall when he made a contract with Standard Oil of California to exploit oil deposits in Southern Patagonia.

Weak Government

If the dictatorship was not strong enough to bring foreign investments into Argentina to develop the petroleum industry, it stood to reason that the provisional governments of Generals Eduardo Lonardi and Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, who succeeded Perón, could not do so either. One inevitable aftermath of dictatorships is weak government. Students of political science can find recent examples in Argentina, Peru, Colombia and Venezuela. President Aramburu, who was in power during most of the two and a half years of transitional government, could not possibly risk the political upheavals

which would have followed any effort to exploit the oil with foreign money. His chief opponent in that field was the Radical party, and the most vociferous nationalist was the leader of its Intransigent wing, Arturo Frondizi. This, as it turned out, was not without its irony.

The political parties, on the whole, were neither wise nor patriotic; they were looking out for their own political future. Moreover, serious moral deterioration (one might fairly say, corruption) of Argentine public life—another inevitable consequence of dictatorship—was made worse by the fact that General Perón kept his power partly by a deliberate process of dividing, weakening and corrupting the body politic. All forms of totalitarianism have an effect which resembles that of a grave, infectious fever. It takes time to get the poison out of the nation's system and to regain complete health.

Argentina Far from Recovery

If in the case of Argentina Peronism is considered as just such a disease—and it really is that—one can see that the nation is far from recovery. It must always be kept in mind that Perón deliberately and ostentatiously favored what he and his wife, Evita, called the *descamisados*, the shirtless ones. He did give the workers a new and more dignified social status, and while it is debatable whether their real income kept pace with inflation and whether their social services were even remotely worth what they cost, they were a favored and pampered class. Moreover, Perón's downfall came just before Argentina was going over the edge into the abyss of bankruptcy. Thus the workers, who cannot be expected to understand economics, now look back to what they regard as the "prosperous" days of Perón.

One result is a mass residue of Peronists. General Aramburú could

not crush them, and Arturo Frondizi, who assumed the presidency on May 1, cannily wooed and won their votes, which brought him about 1.5 million ballots over those of his opponent in the presidential election.

Señor Frondizi therefore had his own debts to pay—or to repudiate. He had got himself elected by courting the votes of the Peronists, Communists, nationalists, Catholics and his own Intransigent wing of the Radical party, which gave him control of two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies and all the Senators. Since his support came from disparate, and even inimical, elements, it stood to reason that he could not satisfy them all after he took office. In fact, he rather cynically, if sensibly, disregarded all his supporters and tried to deal with his problems on a day-to-day, *ad hoc* basis.

These problems, as has been indicated, were considerable. Politically he had the enormous advantage that he had been elected for a six-year term and nobody wanted another revolution or the overturn of the government. This negative type of support must never be underestimated, as we have seen in Spain, where Generalissimo Francisco Franco has remained in power for two decades mainly because Spaniards could not contemplate the horrors of another civil war. In Argentina, even the military elements, who disapprove of many of the things President Frondizi did at the beginning and who were in a position to stage a coup, on the contrary went out of their way to help the president in the autumn of 1958 when he was threatened by the Peronist trade unions.

The Argentine situation was fraught with ironies. There was the fact that Señor Frondizi wooed the Peronists and Communists and obtained votes but, of course, could not

satisfy them or even carry on unless he acted against them. Argentina had swung from military dictatorship to democracy, but it was clear that the Peronists, who want to turn the clock back to an authoritarian state socialism, and the Communists, who are *ipso facto* antidemocratic, could not be allowed to have their way.

Frondizi's Oil Policy

Even the Radical party—Frondizi's own Intransigent wing and the opposition, moderate Radical wing led by Ricardo Balbín—had to be repudiated. Señor Frondizi had spent a quarter of a century in politics as a Radical, espousing its economic nationalism, and yet the first thing he had to do as president, with the responsibility of power, was to throw over all that he had preached and written (including two books) and seek foreign investments. By now Argentina is spending at the rate of \$300 million a year on petroleum imports, which is an unbearable situation for its finances. As a result, President Frondizi has made oil deals of well over \$1 billion with Standard Oil, Royal Dutch, the American Atlas Corporation combine, German and even Russian firms.

It is true that in each case the arrangements are called "service contracts" and not concessions, and that the government oil monopoly, the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), still owns the oil deposits in the ground and will buy and market whatever oil is produced. This is a less advantageous arrangement than if the foreign companies were allowed to explore, drill, produce and market the oil themselves, as in Venezuela. However, the fiction—or principle—of continued Argentine monopoly control is maintained.

Another major field in which the

Frondizi government has had to be practical rather than nationalist is that of electric power. Perón had wasted vast sums in hydroelectric developments which were not economic. The feasible systems were run with combustible fuels and the investments were mainly American and Belgian. President Frondizi has had the good sense and courage to come to terms with these foreign companies, and they are now going to invest more money for desperately needed electric power.

Nondoctrinaire President

If all this seems haphazard and antisystematic, there is a good reason for it. Frondizi's technique is obviously pragmatic and opportunistic. In getting himself elected president, Frondizi proved that he had no inhibitions about where he got his votes or what he promised. In office, he is proving that he has no inhibitions about what he does or how he does it.

The Peronists have recently learned that they were naïve in thinking that a Frondizi government would do what they wanted. On the contrary, when a Peronist union in the western province of Mendoza struck in opposition to the contracts for foreign investment in the oil industry, Frondizi called on the military for support, declared a state of siege, arrested many of the union leaders and moved ahead. He did the same with the railway workers and with the Peronist unions as a group when they threatened a general strike.

When Vice President Alejandro Gómez objected to the fact that President Frondizi was not behaving at all like a member of the Radical party, it was the loyal Radical, Señor Gómez, who had to go. Señor Frondizi was not being doctrinaire, orthodox or partisan; he was meeting each situation as it arose and doing

what seemed necessary. If he has a pattern or a program, no one has been able to discover it. However, those who criticized his economic nationalism and anti-Yankeism before can hardly, in all consistency, criticize President Frondizi now for accepting foreign investments in the oil industry, coming to terms with the electric power interests, and repudiating the Peronists and Communists. No one can question the fact that he is a genuine democrat and that he wants to remain president for the six years of his elected term. It follows that he will want to do what is right and best for Argentina—and therefore for himself.

Since Argentina needs financial and economic help, both from the United States Export-Import Bank and from the International Monetary Fund, it is also to be assumed that the president will follow at least the minimum economic and fiscal policies necessary to obtain aid from these institutions. There will have to be a certain amount of compromise on both sides and a great deal of patience by foreign countries and creditors. Internally, the military, who have it in their power to overthrow the government, will have to give President Frondizi a maximum degree of leeway and support. Fortunately, the military leaders want democracy to work, and they have no desire to intervene. Fortunately, also, the Peronists are divided and without any leaders of national importance. Nobody, not even the Peronists, wants Perón back now, and in any event he would not be tolerated for a day.

The great and precious boon that Argentines have today is freedom, and they appreciate it. Argentine democracy, in the half century up to 1930, was faulty and limited, but it was real. The Argentines are white, European and homogeneous—much more so, racially, than the popula-

tion of the United States. Their capacity in terms of skills and culture is, exceptionally high. The natural wealth of the country is great and indestructible. Argentina's long history of rivalry with the United States in the economic field and of resentment against our support for their dictator, Perón, is now a matter of the past. The United States would pay a heavy price throughout Latin America if, having been very friendly with a dictatorship in Argentina, it should now fail to support a democracy in that country.

Foreign Aid

That the Administration understands this was indicated by the announcement on December 29 that the United States government, the International Monetary Fund and private banks were to give Argentina loans and other assistance totaling \$329 million—the largest aid program ever devised for a Latin American nation. For its part Argentina, which on December 29 had devalued the peso to the free-market rate and had ended all quantitative restrictions on imports, pledged to carry out a program of internal austerity. This program will involve a temporary period of reduced living standards. Robert Murphy, United States Deputy Under Secretary of State, said on this occasion that “by undertaking to help itself to the greatest extent possible, Argentina has provided a solid basis for requesting, and receiving, the collaboration of others.”

READING SUGGESTIONS: Robert J. Alexander, *Communism in Latin America*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, Rutgers University Press, 1957; Gladys Delmas, “Post-Perón Argentina Takes Inventory,” *The Reporter*, June 12, 1958; George Pendle, *Argentina*, London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955; Tad Szulc, “The Perón Drama: Another Act Opens,” *The New York Times Magazine*, March 9, 1958; Arthur P. Whitaker, *Argentine Upheaval: Perón's Fall and the New Regime*, New York, Praeger, 1956.

Spotlight

(Continued from page 76)

tions and were marshaling their forces against Nasser. Suddenly Washington began to wonder whether, after all, the best way to keep peace in the Middle East and to hold back the Russians might not be to support Nasser, in spite of the fact that he had accepted—and continues to accept—military and economic aid from the U.S.S.R. Mr. Rountree's visit to Cairo was regarded as a step toward improving relations with Egypt, strained by the Lebanon crisis.

Whatever Nasser's ultimate ambitions in the Middle East and Africa might be, it was reasoned, Egypt's president is at least indubitably opposed to communism. Not only has he held down Communists in Egypt (hundreds are said to have been jailed during his administration), but he is now also busy suppressing Communists in Syria. Moreover, it is argued, if it were not for Nasser, a Communist victory in Iraq might result in a new realignment—this time of Syria with Iraq, in a "Fertile Crescent" federation—with highly dangerous consequences for the Middle East. At Port Said on December 23 Nasser assailed the Communist party in Syria for rising against Arab nationalism. If the choice is between communism and Nasserism, some American officials contend, the

United States must choose Nasser.

This view has been challenged by Israel, which believes that Nasser is now fighting for his political leadership, challenged not only by Iraq and some elements in Syria, but also by Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. Why, Israelis ask, should the United States, at this juncture, intervene to save Nasser, and thereby increase his menace to the Middle East? According to Israeli spokesmen, there is a third alternative—the alternative of peace-minded, noncommitted, anti-Nasser Arabs, with Lebanon as the prime example. But, sceptics ask, is Lebanon to be taken as a portent of the future, or is it the exception that proves the rule of prevailing anti-Israeli and anti-Western nationalism among Arabs?

Amid this crisscrossing of ambitions, conflicts and anxieties of an area which remains in turmoil, one thing is clear. Peace cannot be achieved merely by the intervention of the great powers, acting separately or together. The various Arab leaders are determined to decide their own future, in accordance with their countries' interests as they see them, opposing all intervention from the U.S.S.R. as well as the West; at the same time they want to tap all available sources of aid, irrespective of ideology. Meanwhile, behind the scenes, United Nations Secretary General

Dag Hammarskjöld, during the Christmas holiday season, has been working to ease tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbors—without fanfare, and without dramatic expectations of a quick peace.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

(The fourth of nine articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1959"—Reshaping Foreign Policy Amid Revolutions—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)

FPA Bookshelf

NOVELS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

The Devil's Agent (New York, Felt, 1958, \$4.50) is an indictment of secret services everywhere. The life of a spy is not to be envied, according to its author, Hans Habe. But it makes exciting, although at times frightening, reading.

The plight of the poverty-stricken inhabitants of a small fishing village on the Spanish coast is vividly portrayed in *Reapers of the Storm* (New York, Crowell, 1958, \$3.95), by Elizabeth Lyttleton and Herbert Sturz, who weave an interesting novel out of their extensive experiences with Spanish life.

Mission Accomplished, by Mongo Beti (New York, Macmillan, 1958, \$3.50), while focusing on the problems that arise out of conflict between old customs and new, is an amusing and light-hearted story by a Bantu about the French Cameroons.

AUSTRALIA

Australian Accent, by John Douglas Pringle (London, Chatto and Windus, 1958, 18s.) is one of the best and liveliest commentaries about Australia, ranging from politics to art and poetry. The author, a Scot who was recently editor of *The Sydney Morning Herald* for five years, thinks Australia has more in common with the United States than with its mother country, Britain. It is superbly illustrated by the *Herald's* cartoonist, George Molnar.

FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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In this issue:

New Hope for Cyprus and Algeria—M. Rossi	73
Western Europe Forges Economic Union— N. Stanford	75
Peace in the Middle East . . . Whose Job?— V. M. Dean	76
Argentina Moving Toward Democracy— H. L. Matthews	77
FPA Bookshelf	80

In the next issue:

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